Order Appointing Court Approved Reporter as Official Reporter Pro Tempore September 09, 2020 (2024)

Related Contentin Los Angeles County

Case

SAMVEL HAKOBYAN, ET AL. VS ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION

Aug 29, 2024 |Maureen Duffy-Lewis |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV22227

Case

WILLIAM ADAMYAN VS STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

Aug 28, 2024 |Frank M. Tavelman |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |24NNCV03866

Case

USB LEASING LT VS ANNA EVTUKHOVA

Aug 26, 2024 |Stephen Morgan |Other Contract Dispute (not breach/insurance/fraud/negligence) (General Jurisdiction) |Other Contract Dispute (not breach/insurance/fraud/negligence) (General Jurisdiction) |24AVCV01046

Case

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY VS HENRICK ZAZYN

Aug 28, 2024 |Barbara Ann Meiers |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV21961

Case

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY VS KENNETH RIOS, ET AL.

Aug 28, 2024 |Rupert A. Byrdsong |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV21973

Case

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION VS HESAM MOVAHEDIASL, ET AL.

Aug 26, 2024 |Ashfaq G. Chowdhury |Other Contract Dispute (not breach/insurance/fraud/negligence) (General Jurisdiction) |Other Contract Dispute (not breach/insurance/fraud/negligence) (General Jurisdiction) |24NNCV03799

Case

TANYA BERENSON VS STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY

Aug 23, 2024 |Mark A. Young |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |24SMCV04109

Case

CHAMELEON BEVERAGE COMPANY, INC. VS CLEAN BOTTLING, INC.

Aug 27, 2024 |Steve Cochran |Other Contract Dispute (not breach/insurance/fraud/negligence) (General Jurisdiction) |Other Contract Dispute (not breach/insurance/fraud/negligence) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV21872

Case

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY VS DRE MICHAEL GALINDO, ET AL.

Aug 28, 2024 |Kerry R. Bensinger |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |Insurance Coverage (not complex) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV21945

Ruling

STACY KATE YEH VS BARRINGTON PACIFIC, LLC A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Sep 03, 2024 |20STCV42994

Case Number: 20STCV42994 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT STACY KATE YEH, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. BARRINGTON PACIFIC, LLC, et al., Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 20STCV42994 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION TO TAX COSTS Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. September 3, 2024 On February 13, 2024, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants Barrington Pacific LLC, Shores Barrington LLC, and Defendant DE Glendon LLC, and against Plaintiff Stacy Kate Yeh and Plaintiffs of all related and consolidated cases. On February 26, 2024, Defendants filed a notice of entry of judgment, reflecting service of the judgment on Plaintiffs on the same date. On March 12, 2024, Defendants filed a Memorandum of Costs. On March 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to tax costs. Plaintiffs argue that the Memorandum of Costs is untimely. A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).) Plaintiffs counsel contends that the Judgment was mailed by the Clerk of Court to both Plaintiffs and Defendants counsel on February 13, 2024, so Defendants Memorandum of Costs filed on March 12, 2024 is untimely. (Motion at p. 2; Shakouri Decl. ¶ 3.) The Court Clerk did not mail notice of entry of judgment when judgment was entered. The judgment was only signed and filed. [T]o qualify as a notice of entry of judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5, the clerks mailed notice must affirmatively state that it was given upon order by the court or under section 664.5 and a certificate of mailing the notice must be executed and placed in the file. (Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 64.) Defendants Memorandum of Costs, filed 15 days after service of the notice of entry of judgment, is timely. The motion to tax costs is DENIED. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 3rd day of September 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

COLE FREEMAN VS STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, A BUSINESS ENTITY FORM UNKNOWN

Aug 28, 2024 |24CHCV00177

Case Number: 24CHCV00177 Hearing Date: August 28, 2024 Dept: F43 Cole Freeman vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Trial Date: N/A MOTION TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance Company RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Cole Freeman RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Strike · Portion of Paragraph 27 that requests punitive damages · Paragraph 50(a)-(c) · Portion of Paragraph 51 that requests punitive damages · Item b.(ii) of the prayer (punitive damages) RULING: Motion to strike is denied. SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Cole Freemans (Plaintiff) motorhome was vandalized and sustained water damage. Plaintiff filed this action because he alleges that Defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (Defendant) would not cover the full extent of Plaintiffs losses. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges four causes of action for (1) declaratory relief; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of implied covenant of good faith; and (4) bad faith denial of insurance coverage. After this Court granted Defendants previous motion to strike related to Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, Plaintiff filed his FAC on May 28, 2024. Defendant filed the present motion to strike on June 28, 2024. Plaintiff opposes Defendants motion. Defendant has again moved to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages and related allegations. ANALYSIS A court may strike from the complaint any irrelevant, false, or improper matter. Under CCP § 435, [a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. Under CCP § 436(a), [t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. Under CCP § 436(b), the court may [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. Punitive Damages Punitive damages are governed by Civ. Code § 3294: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) To state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in Civ. Code § 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Id. at 725.) Oppression is despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) Fraud is defined as an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004 explained that punitive damages sometimes may be assessed in unintentional tort actions. Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895 noted that something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circ*mstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wanton. Indeed, punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiffs rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate. (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210 (internal quotation omitted).) The conclusory characterization of defendants conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of oppression, fraud or malice&within the meaning of section 3294. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) It is not sufficient to allege merely that defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice. Rather, plaintiff must allege specific facts showing that defendants conduct was oppressive, fraudulent or malicious (e.g., that defendant acted with the intent to inflict great bodily harm on plaintiff or to destroy plaintiff's property or reputation). (Croskey, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Insurance Litigation Ch. 13-C (Thomson Reuters, 2016) ¶ 13:197.2; and see, Anschutz Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Snepp (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 598, 643 [allegations that defendants conduct was intentional, and done willfully, maliciously, with ill will towards Plaintiffs, and with conscious disregard for Plaintiff's rights did not satisfy specific pleading requirements].) Plaintiffs FAC alleges that his claim for punitive damages is based on verbal statements allegedly made by State Farm agents when they inspected Plaintiffs motor home. Plaintiff alleges that they acknowledged that vandalism was the cause of all of Plaintiffs claimed damages. However, Defendant argues that these allegations are not specific enough and that these allegations contradict the Partial Coverage Letter dated July 10, 2023, that State Farm sent to Plaintiff and which is attached as Exhibit 5 to Plaintiffs FAC. However, the statements in the letter are consistent with the rest of Plaintiffs allegations. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages is based on a legal conclusion rather than specific facts that would support the claim for punitive damages. However, as Plaintiff argues in his opposition, Plaintiffs FAC contains sufficient allegations for Plaintiff to maintain a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs FAC lays out the conduct by Defendant that would be malicious or oppressive due to its arbitrary and unreasonable nature. (FAC, ¶ 26.) First, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that an investigation had been completed prior to his motor home even being inspected, and Defendant denied any and all coverage based on general wear and tear. (FAC, ¶ 26(a)-(b).) Then, Defendant sent inspectors in June 2023 and September 2023, who admitted that the vandals had has causes the extensive interior water damage, but Defendants only extended minimal coverage to three exterior doors without providing coverage for interior water damages. (FAC, ¶ 26(c)-(d).) After this failure to extend coverage, further attempts by Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney to communicate with Defendant have been met with silence. (FAC, ¶ 26(f)-(i).) Additionally, Plaintiffs alleges that Defendant breached its obligations under the policy by failing to conduct a full, prompt, and thorough investigation; by delaying investigation of Plaintiffs claim; by delaying processing the claim and payment of benefits to Plaintiff; by denying Plaintiffs claim; by failing to settle the claim within a reasonable amount of time; and by failing to communicate with Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 46.) Plaintiff further argues that these allegations amount to malicious and oppressive conduct. (FAC, ¶ 50.) All the foregoing allegations, when taken together, amount to conduct sufficient to meet the requirements for a claim for punitive damages based on malice or oppression. Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion to strike is denied. Moving party to give notice to all parties.

Ruling

Aug 29, 2024 |24CHCV00906

Case Number: 24CHCV00906 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 1 24CHCV00906 KENNETH M. STERN vs VOSS, COOK & THEL LLP Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing Regarding Courts Undesignating Case as Related to Stern v. Barrister TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing Regarding Courts Undesignating Case as Related to Stern v. Barrister Relate Cases is DENIED. Defendants to give notice. Background of 24CHCV00906 Stern v. Voss, Cook & Thel On March 19, 2024, Kenneth M. Stern filed this action against Voss, Cook & Thel LLP and James G. Damon asserting causes of action for: (1) federal wire fraud by B. & P. 17200; (2) California state wire fraud; and (3) declaratory relief on breach of contract. The complaint alleges Plaintiff is a tenant of Barrister Executive Suites, Inc. and it attempted to wrongfully evict Plaintiff with fake Notices to Quit. On April 22, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Related Case involving 24CHCV00906 and 22STCV32529 Stern v. Barrister Executive Suites. On June 5, 2024, Judge Wendy Chang issued an order finding 24CHCV00906 and 22STCV32529 were related within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 3.300. On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a peremptory challenge in 24CHCV00906, which Judge Chang accepted on June 20, 2024. In the June 20, 2024 order accepting the peremptory challenge, Judge Chang stated, in part, [t]he case [24CHCV00906] is ordered transferred to Judge Michelle Williams Court in Department 1 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse for reassignment purposes only. On June 25, 2024, Department 1 issued an order noting the acceptance of the peremptory challenge and stating the interest of justice is not served by reassigning case number 22STCV32529 to a new Judicial Officer. Therefore, this Court determines that cases 22STCV32529 and 24CHCV00906 should no longer be related. Case 24CHCV00906 is returned to Judge David B. Gelfound in Department F49, Chatsworth Courthouse, pursuant to its original assignment, for all purposes. This case is currently pending in Department F49 of the Chatsworth Courthouse with the next hearing set for September 18, 2024. Motion for Reconsideration Standard When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circ*mstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circ*mstances, or law are claimed to be shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).) Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated a Basis for Reconsideration Plaintiff contends this Court improperly unrelated the two cases and lacked the authority to change the order relating the two cases made by Judge Chang. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(h)(1)(A), [w]here all the cases listed in the notice are unlimited civil cases, . . . the judge who has the earliest filed case must determine whether the cases must be ordered related and assigned to his or her department. Here, 22STCV32529 was pending before Judge Chang in Department 36, who initially related the two cases. However, both cases cannot be assigned to Judge Chang due to the acceptance of a peremptory challenge in the later filed case. As acknowledged by Plaintiff, one trial judge may alter orders made by another where the prior judge is unavailable. (Mot. at 3:24-25 citing In re Marriage of Oliverez (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1247 (A trial court's discretion to reconsider another judge's prior ruling is necessarily narrow and usually only appropriate when the prior judge is unavailable.).) Judge Changs acceptance of a peremptory challenge in 24CHCV00906 renders Judge Chang unavailable in that action. (See e.g. Torres v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 497, 509 (Judge Thomasson had the inherent authority to review Judge Abdallah's ruling, because Judge Abdallah was unavailable once he granted the challenge aimed at him.); Geddes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 417, 426 (Where a judge has been disqualified, the newly-assigned judge may review the ruling of the disqualified judge because the disqualified judge, having no authority to rule, is unavailable.).) The judicial administration goals of the related case rules must yield to the parties right to file a peremptory challenge. (See e.g. Rothstein v. Superior Court (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 424, 431.) Moreover, the peremptory challenge statutes should not be used as a mechanism to effectively extend the time requirements for a peremptory challenge in the earlier filed case. (Ibid. n.3. See also The Home Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1025, 1032 (section 170.6 is designed to prevent abuse by parties that merely seek to . . . obtain a more favorable judicial forum.).) Department 1 had the authority to issue the order unrelating the two cases and Plaintiffs motion is DENIED. The cases shall remain as assigned by this Court on June 25, 2024.

Ruling

CESAR ROMERO ET AL VS BROCCA CUSTOM FINISHING CARPENTRY INC

Aug 30, 2024 |BC590284

Ruling

CURTIS CROFT VS LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.

Aug 29, 2024 |19STCV40504

Case Number: 19STCV40504 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 57 The Court is granting the motion of Defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty) for relief under Code of Civil Procedure Section 473(b) from the Court's entry of a default against Liberty on April 30, 2024. The Court entered the default when granting Plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions against Liberty. The Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions based on the Court's view that Liberty had willfully disregarded discovery orders in this case, including, as most pertinent here, an October 18, 2023 discovery order. Having reviewed Liberty's Section 473(b) motion and the accompanying declaration of Blake Russum, one of Liberty's outside attorneys, the Court has concluded that Liberty's action that ran counter to the October 18, 2023 order was not the product of a willful disregard of the order, but rather, was rooted in a mistaken interpretation of it. Accordingly, Liberty is entitled to mandatory relief from the default under Section 473(b), which provides that "the Court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by attorneys sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk . . . or (2) resulting default judgment . . . entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. The Court disagrees with Plaintiff's argument that Section 473(b) relief is not applicable to defaults entered as a discovery sanction. The caselaw is to the contrary. Plaintiff is on stronger footing in arguing that the declaration that Russum submitted in support of Liberty's Section 473(b) motion cannot be squared with the statements made by Russum's partner and fellow counsel for Liberty Norman Lau at the hearing on Plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions. According to Plaintiff, Lau's statements manifest an intentional, strategic choice by Liberty to ignore the Court's October 18, 2023 order. The Court acknowledges that there is some tension between Russum's declaration and Lau's statements. In the end, however, the two strands can be reconciled. This harmonization has led the Court to conclude that Lau did in fact make a mistake in interpreting the October 18, 2023 order and thus Section 473(b) relief is available and must be granted. The Court stands by what it said to Lau at the hearing on the terminating sanctions motion: if Liberty did not fully understand the October 18, 2023 order, it should have sought clarification of it from the Court instead of throwing caution to the wind and taking action that the Court determined contravened the order. But the failure to seek clarification, too, was a mistake of Liberty's counsel and thus part and parcel of the basis for relief from default under Section 473(b).

Ruling

BLACK BREWED COFFEE L.L.C. VS BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY DIRECT INSURANCE COMPANY

Aug 27, 2024 |23STCV24849

Case Number: 23STCV24849 Hearing Date: August 27, 2024 Dept: 34 Ourian Investment Corp. v. Hedley, et al. (23STCV02215) The Motion to be Relieved as Counsel brought by Putterman Law, APC, counsel for Defendant Kelly Swartz, is GRANTED, effective upon the filing of a proof of service showing service of the signed order upon the Client at the Clients last known address. Background Plaintiff Ourian Investment Corp. (Plaintiff) alleges the following: On or about April 22nd, 2021, Plaintiff and Defendant Todd Hedley (Hedley) executed and entered into Loan Agreements. Under the terms and conditions of the loan, Plaintiff was to lend Defendant Hedley at total of $150,000.00 and Defendant Hedley was required to repay Plaintiff in full. Defendant Kelly Swartz (Swartz and along with Hedley as Defendants) was received fraudulent transfers from Defendant Headley. On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting causes of action against Defendants and Does 1-100 for: 1. Breach of Contract; 2. Breach of Contract 3. Civil Code § 3439.04(a)(1); 4. Civil Code § 3439.04(a)(2) 5. Civil Code § 3439.05; and, 6. Fraudulent Transfers Pursuant to Common Law. A Motion to Enforce Settlement is scheduled for September 20, 2024. A Final Status Conference is scheduled for October 1, 2024 and a Jury Trial is scheduled for October 14, 2025. Discussion[1] Putterman Law, APC (Firm) seeks to be relieved as counsel of record for Defendant Swartz (Client). The court has discretion to allow an attorney to withdraw, and such a motion should be granted provided that there is no prejudice to the client and it does not disrupt the orderly process of justice. (See Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1362 requires (1) a notice of motion and motion directed to the client (made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-051)); (2) a declaration stating in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under section 284(1) (made on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-052)); (3) service of the notice of motion and motion, the declaration, and the proposed order on the client and on all other parties who have appeared in the case; and (4) a proposed order relieving counsel (prepared on the Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as CounselCivil form (MC-053)). The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. Attorney Matt Putterman (Putterman) represents that Client has materially breached the retainer agreement with [his] firm. As a result, there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court determines that the requirements of Rules of Court Rule 3.1362 enumerated above have been sufficiently met. Accordingly, the motion is granted, effective upon the filing of a proof of service showing service of the signed order upon the Client at the Clients last known address. [1] The motion was filed (and served electronically) on July 24, 2024, and set for hearing on August 27, 2024.

Ruling

BOGHOS TOVMASSIAN, ET AL. VS HIPPOS INSURANCE SERVICE, ET AL.

Aug 30, 2024 |23STCV10128

Case Number: 23STCV10128 Hearing Date: August 30, 2024 Dept: 32 BOGHOS TOVMASSIAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HIPPO INSURANCE SERVICES, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV10128 Hearing Date: August 30, 2024 [TENTATIVE] order RE: defendants motion for summary judgment BACKGROUND On May 5, 2023, Plaintiffs Boghos Tovmassian and Marguerite Tovmassian filed this action against Defendants Hippo Insurance Services (Hippo), Spinnaker Insurance Company (Spinnaker), and Patrick Hix, alleging (1) breach of insurance contract, (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) elder abuse. According to the complaint, Plaintiffs own a home located in Tujunga, California (the Property). (Compl. ¶ 1.) The Property was insured by a homeowners insurance policy issued by Hippo, which is owned and underwritten by Spinnaker. (Ibid.) In December 2021, the Property suffered wind and water intrusion, leading Plaintiffs to make a claim. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to conduct a full and fair investigation, which resulted in an insufficient payout. (Id., ¶ 3.) On April 25, 2024, Hippo and Spinnaker filed the instant motion for summary judgment. The initial hearing date was July 12, 2024. On June 28, 2024, Plaintiffs appeared for an ex parte to continue the motion for summary judgment. This ex parte was denied by the court, and Plaintiffs were instructed to include their basis for seeking a continuance in their Opposition papers. Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On July 10, 2024, Plaintiff appeared for another ex parte application to continue the motion. Even though the deadline to file an Opposition had passed, the Court granted the ex parte application. At the hearing, Plaintiffs counsel advised the court that he would be filing a motion to compel by July 15, 2024, to obtain the necessary discovery to oppose the motion. To date, no motion to compel discovery has been filed with the court. Plaintiffs opposition to the motion was due on or before August 16, 2024. No opposition to the motion was filed. On August 28, 2024, Plaintiffs appeared for yet another ex parte application to continue the motion. The court denied the ex parte. LEGAL STANDARD The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) DISCUSSION I. Hippos Liability a. Plaintiffs Had No Contract with Hippo To establish breach of contract, a plaintiff must show: (1) the contract existed, (2) the plaintiffs performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) A plaintiff cannot assert a claim for breach of contract against one who is not a party to the contract. (Tri-Continent Internat. Corp. v. Paris Savings & Loan Assn. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1359.) It is undisputed that the policy was issued by Spinnaker, with Hippo as the program administrator. (Def.s Undisputed Facts (UF) 1; Carden Decl., Ex. A.) The policy was signed by Spinnakers CEO. (Ibid.) Therefore, Hippo has satisfied its initial burden by showing that it was not a party to the policy with Plaintiffs. This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Hippo is not liable for breach of contract as a matter of law. b. Hippo Cannot be Liable for the Implied Covenant The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other partys right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-50.) In the absence of a contractual relationship, no implied covenant claims may be stated. (Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 422, 430.) As discussed above, Hippo has established that it had no contractual relationship with Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot maintain an implied covenant claim against Hippo. c. Hippo Cannot be Liable for Elder Abuse Financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the following: takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30.) Hippo could not have wrongfully retained Plaintiffs property (i.e., the insurance proceeds) if it was not a party to the policy and did not have any obligation to pay Plaintiffs. Therefore, the elder abuse claim fails as a matter of law. II. Spinnakers Liability a. The Claims are Time-Barred Under California law parties may agree to a provision shortening the statute of limitations, qualified, however, by the requirement that the period fixed is not in itself unreasonable or is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. (William L. Lyon & Associates, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1307, quoting Capehart v. Heady (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 386, 388.) [A] covenant shortening the period of limitations is a valid provision of an insurance contract and cannot be ignored with impunity as long as the limitation is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. (Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 683.) One year was not an unfair period of limitation. (Ibid.; see also Ins. Code, § 2071(a) [imposing one-year limitations period for fire insurance claims].) The statute of limitations for actions on insurance claims is equitably tolled from the time the insured notifies the insurer of the claim until coverage is denied. (Marselis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 122, 124.) The reason for the tolling rule is to avoid penalizing the insured for the time consumed by the insurer investigating the claim. (Id. at p. 125.) The running of the limitations period resumes upon the insurers denial of a claim, and no further tolling occurs, even if the insurer reconsiders its denial. (Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 135, 142.) Here, the insurance policy provides that [n]o action can be brought against us unless . . . the action is started within one year after the date of loss. (Carden Decl., Ex. A.) The loss occurred on December 30, 2021. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs reported the loss to Spinnaker on January 8, 2022. (Carden Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. B.) Spinnaker issued notice of its coverage position on January 27, 2022, granting coverage on certain items and denying the rest. (Id., ¶ 5, Ex. C.) Plaintiffs did not file this action until May 5, 2023, well past the one-year limitations period, even accounting for the tolling period between January 8, 2022 and January 27, 2022. Spinnakers reopening of the claim on May 17, 2022 based on Plaintiffs request for reconsideration (Carden Decl. ¶13) did not further toll the limitations period. Therefore, Spinnaker has met its initial burden by establishing that the claims are time-barred.[1] This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Spinnaker is not liable as a matter of law. b. Spinnaker Did Not Breach the Policy There can be no breach of the insurance policy . . . [where] the undisputed evidence established that [the insurer] paid all amounts due under the policy. (Janney v. CSAA Ins. Exchange (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 374, 390.) Here, the policy covered direct physical loss to property. (Carden Decl., Ex. A.) Spinnaker covered damage to the first-floor flooring, the only part of the Property directly damaged by the water intrusion. (Carden Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. F.) Spinnaker declined to cover the undamaged stairs and second-floor flooring. (Ibid.) Spinnaker issued payment for the covered portions. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. C, D.) Spinnaker has met its initial burden by showing that it satisfied its obligations under the policy. This is sufficient to shift the burden to Plaintiffs, who do not oppose the motion or present any contrary evidence. Accordingly, Spinnaker is not liable for breach of contract as a matter of law for this independent reason. c. Spinnaker Could Not Have Breached the Implied Covenant [A] bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due. (Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1153.) Spinnaker could not have acted in bad faith if it correctly denied policy coverage. Furthermore, as discussed above, the claim is time-barred. Therefore, the implied covenant claim fails as a matter of law. d. Spinnaker Could Not Have Committed Elder Abuse Likewise, Spinnaker could not have wrongfully retained insurance benefits if it correctly denied them, and the claim is time-barred in any case. Therefore, the elder abuse claim fails as a matter of law. CONCLUSION The motion for summary judgment filed by Hippo and Spinnaker is GRANTED. [1] This applies to all three causes of action, not just breach of contract, because the policy states that no action may be brought outside one year. The policy does not restrict the limitations period to claims on the policy itself. Furthermore, where the essence of [a] claim[] is an attempt to recover [d]amages for failure to provide benefits under subject contract of insurance, the claim is fundamentally a claim on the policy and is thus time barred under the limitations period stated in the policy. (Magnolia Square Homeowners Ass'n v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1063, quoting Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins. Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 565, 575.)

Ruling

ROBERT GOLIGHTLY VS PACIFIC COAST SUSTAINABLE ASSETS, LLC, ET AL

Aug 26, 2024 |23STCV18472

Case Number: 23STCV18472 Hearing Date: August 26, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: August 26, 2024 TRIAL DATE: March 18, 2025 CASE: Robert Golightly v. Pacific Coast Sustainable Assets, LLC. CASE NO.: 23STCV18472 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE); REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS MOVING PARTY: Defendant Yajac Agriculture, LLC RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Robert Golightly CASE HISTORY: · 10/24/22: Complaint filed. · 08/04/23: First Amended Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is an action for breach of contract. Plaintiff contracted with Defendants to manage and operate a farm owned by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in violation of the terms of his contract. Defendant Yajac Agriculture, LLC moves to compel further responses to special interrogatories, and for sanctions. TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Yajac Agriculture, LLCs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant supplemental responses without objections within 30 days of this order. Defendants request for sanctions is GRANTED against Plaintiff and his counsel, jointly and severally. Payment is to be made within 10 days of this order. // DISCUSSION: Defendant Yajac Agriculture, LLC moves to compel further responses to special interrogatories, and for sanctions. Legal Standard Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, subdivision (a), a court may order a party to serve a further response to an interrogatory when the court finds that: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete[;] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate[; or] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. The burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully answer the interrogatories. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) Timing: A motion to compel further responses to interrogatories must be served within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the responding party have agreed in writing. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.300(c).) The 45-day requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. (Sexton v. Superior Court¿(1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) Defendant served its first set of Special Interrogatories on Plaintiff on April 1, 2024. (Declaration of Niki Kalantari ISO Mot. ¶ 2 Exh. 1.) Plaintiff served responses on May 6, 2024. (Id. ¶ 3 Exh. 2.) On June 14, 2024, the parties agreed in writing to extend the deadline to bring this motion to July 24, 2024, the date this motion was filed and served. (Id. ¶ 5 Exh. 4.) The motion is therefore timely. Meet and Confer A party making a motion to compel further responses must also include a declaration stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to resolve informally the issues presented by the motion before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2030.300 (b)(1).) Defendants counsel states that her office sent a meet and confer letter concerning these responses to Plaintiffs counsel on June 12, 2024. (Kalantari Decl. ¶ 4 Exh. 3.) Plaintiffs counsel responded on June 14, 2024, agreeing to extend the motion deadline while he evaluated the arguments in the letter. (Id. ¶ 5 Exh. 4.) On July 5, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel sent a further email stating that supplemental responses would be served by July 15, 2024. (Id.) No responses were served. (Id. ¶ 6.) In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Defendants counsel has misrepresented the meet-and-confer process because Plaintiffs counsel sent a follow-up email on July 20, 2024, asserting objections not made in the responses, arguing that the responses were sufficient, and accusing Defendants counsel of discovery abuse. The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiffs about-face after promising supplemental responses does not demonstrate a failure by Defendant to engage in a good faith attempt to informally resolve this dispute. The Court finds that Defendant has satisfied its statutory meet and confer obligations. Plaintiffs Untimely Opposition Defendant served and filed its motion on July 24, 2024 for a hearing on August 26, 2024. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b), Plaintiffs opposition was due nine court days before the scheduled hearing, which would place the deadline for the opposition on August 13, 2024. Plaintiffs opposition was served and filed on August 14, 2024, one day late. (See Opposition POS.) Plaintiff offers no explanation for this untimely filing. However, as Defendant served and filed a timely and substantive reply brief, the Court finds that Defendant was not prejudiced by Plaintiffs late opposition. The Court will therefore consider the merits of Plaintiffs opposition. Plaintiffs Procedural Objection Plaintiff objects to the motion as failing to specify the interrogatories for which a further response is sought in the Notice of Motion. Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, Rule of Court 3.1345(d) only requires that the motion identify the interrogatories to which it pertains by set and number. (Cal Rule of Court 3.1345(d).) A cursory inspection of the memorandum of points and authorities attached to the Notice of Motion demonstrates that the motion concerns Special Interrogatories Set One Nos. 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101, 104, 107, 114, 118, 121, 124, 127, 128, 131, 134, 137, 140, 143, 149-150, and 153-156. The motion is not deficient in this respect. Identification of Documents (Interrogatory No. 128) Special Interrogatory No. 128 asks Plaintiff to identify all documents relating to his response to Interrogatory No. 126, seeking all facts supporting his contention that Defendant breached its duty to account to Plaintiff, as alleged in paragraph 21(c) of the First Amended Complaint. (Defendants Exh. 1. Nos. 128, 126.) Defendants interrogatories defined identify with respect to documents to mean to state the title or caption, date, subject matter, author, addressee, all PERSON(s) to whom the document was sent, the custodian of the document, and the relevant bates number(s) where applicable. (Id. p.3:12-14.) Plaintiff responded only Banking records pertaining to PCSA. (Defendants Exh. 2. p.34:4.) Plaintiffs assertion to the contrary notwithstanding (see opposition p.4:13-17), this response is plainly inadequate. A vague reference to unspecified banking records is not a straightforward and complete response as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220(a). If, as asserted in the opposition, Plaintiff does not know and cannot, by reasonable inquiry, determine which records specifically contain the relevant information, Plaintiffs response should have so stated, as required by section 2030.220 subdivisions (b) and (c). Plaintiffs response to interrogatory No. 128 is inadequate on its face. Identification of Witnesses (Interrogatories Nos. 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101, 104, 107, 114, 118, 121, 124, 127, 131, 134, 137, 140, 143) Special Interrogatories Nos. 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101, 104, 107, 114, 118, 121, 124, 127, 131, 134, 137, 140, and 143 ask Plaintiff to identify all persons with knowledge of the facts supporting various contentions alleged in the First Amended Complaint, as referenced in the immediately-preceding interrogatories. (See, e.g., Defendants Exh. 1 No. 2.) The interrogatories required Plaintiff to state the name, last known address, contact information including telephone numbers and email addresses. (See Exh. 1. p.3:8-11.) Although Defendant named individuals in response to each interrogatory, Defendant consistently failed to provide full names and contact information for each person named. (See, e.g., Exh. 2. Nos. 2, 5, 8.) Moreover, Defendant responded to certain interrogatories, such as Interrogatories Nos. 104 and 107, by also naming unspecified representatives of Humboldt County and the State of California. (Exh. 2. Nos. 104, 107.) Defendant is entitled to straightforward and complete responses to these interrogatories, and Plaintiffs responses do not meet that standard. Defendant is entitled to further responses to these interrogatories. The Court also observes that the header of subsection 3.B of Defendants motion also references Special Interrogatory No. 27 as part of this subset. (Motion p.5:19-22.) Interrogatory No. 27 seeks identification of documents, not individuals, and is not discussed in the section of the brief in which it is referenced. The Court therefore construes the reference to Interrogatory No. 27 as an inadvertent typographical error, and will disregard that Interrogatory. Payments and Product Yields (Interrogatories Nos. 149, 150, 153-156) Special Interrogatories Nos. 149 and 150 ask Plaintiff to state his contribution to Defendant Pacific Coast Sustainable Assets in 2012 and 2013, respectively. (Defendants Exh. 1. Nos. 149-150.) Interrogatories Nos. 153 through 156 ask Plaintiff to state the product yielded in the 2012 and 2013 harvests and the sales proceeds from each. (Id. Nos. 153-156.) Rather than stating the amounts, Plaintiffs responses simply stated that the information is reflected in the Honeydew Farms financial records. (Defendants Exh. 2. Nos. 149, 150, 153-56.) Defendant contends that these responses are inadequate because the interrogatories seek straightforward numbers or dollar amounts, not a reference to documents. Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs reference to the records is inadequate because it does not constitute a proper invocation of Section 2030.230 (regarding preparation of a summary from records) and does not specify the relevant writings in sufficient detail to permit Defendant to ascertain the answer. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.230.) The Court concurs. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs claims that the documents are impeccably organized, a vague reference to a folder of documents is not a sufficient response to an interrogatory asking for a straightforward dollar or numerical value. Defendant is entitled to an order compelling further responses. Sanctions Defendant also requests sanctions in the amount of $2,486.50 against Plaintiff and his counsel, jointly and severally, for the inadequate responses at issue on this motion. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 authorizes the Court to impose monetary sanctions on any attorney engaging in the misuse of the discovery process by requiring that attorney to pay the reasonable expenses incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300(d) requires the Court to impose sanctions against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Failure to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery is a misuse of the discovery process for which sanctions may be imposed. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(d); 2023.030(a).) Sanctions are mandatory on the party or attorney or both whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated a motion to deem requests for admissions as admitted. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c).) Defendant requests sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,486.50, based on 3 hours of attorney time actually incurred at $485 per hour, plus one hour anticipated to prepare the reply papers and one hour anticipated to attend the hearing on this motion, plus $61 in filing fees. (Kalantari Decl. ¶ 7.) The Court finds the requested amount to be reasonable based on the record presented. CONCLUSION: Accordingly, Defendant Yajac Agriculture, LLCs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to provide verified, code-compliant supplemental responses without objections within 30 days of this order. Defendants request for sanctions in the amount of $2,486.50 is GRANTED against Plaintiff and his counsel, jointly and severally. Payment is to be made within 10 days of this order. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 26, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

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